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1. Introduction 
The UK higher education sector has expanded remarkably over the past 
three decades. In 1993, 13% of 25- to 29-year-olds had first degrees or 
higher degrees. By 2015, this had roughly tripled to 41%. Naturally, one 
may wonder whether the big expansion has reduced the economic returns 
to having a first degree. We have all heard stories about graduate 
unemployment and graduates employed in low-wage jobs. But what do the 
data show and what can we learn from history? 
This briefing note will document the historical trends of rising graduate 
numbers and their relative wages, and provide economic intuition for 
what is driving these trends. Understanding the past will be helpful in 
thinking about the future: if the proportion of graduates continues to 
increase (which is rather likely given current policies), will it lower 
graduate earnings? 
Throughout, we will use the word ‘graduate’ to refer to anyone with first 
degrees or higher-level qualifications and ‘school-leavers’ for those with at 
least GCSEs grade C or equivalent qualifications and without degree-level 
qualifications. 2 The interested reader can find some summary statistics on 
graduates and school-leavers in Table 1 at the end of this briefing note.  
                                                     
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) through the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy at 
IFS (grant number ES/M010147/1). 
2 According to chart 7 in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2016Q1, the graduate 
wage premium relative to those without qualifications has fallen substantially over the 
past 20 years. The main difference between their approach and ours is that we focus on 
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2. The puzzle  
 Fact 1: The UK has seen a rapid increase in the proportion of young 
people with degrees over the past three decades. Comparing across 
birth cohorts, the sharpest increase in the graduate proportion 
occurred between those born in the late 1960s and those born in the 
late 1970s.  
Between 1993 and 2015, the proportion of graduates among 25- to 29-
year-olds has increased from 13% to 41%, while the proportion of people 
without GCSE or equivalent qualifications has dropped by more than half. 
Another way to view the rise in graduates is by birth cohort. Figure 1 
presents the proportion of young men and women with first degrees by 
five-year birth cohort. 
Figure 1. Percentage of 25- to 29-year-olds with first degrees or above, by birth 
cohort and gender 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Labour Force Survey 1992–2015. 
The proportion of graduates has been increasing in successive birth 
cohorts, with the fastest growth occurring between the 1965–69 and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the difference between “graduates” and “school-leavers” (those with GCSEs at grade C 
or above, including A-levels and below-degree-level higher education qualifications); 
whereas they compared graduates to the “no-qualification” group. There is also a 
technical difference in our methodologies. The Bank report uses wage regressions 
conditioning on a range of job characteristics, whereas we show the raw data as they 
are. For example, higher education increases the probability of a higher-paid 
occupation, therefore conditioning on occupation appears to reduce the return to 
higher education. The interested reader should email wenchao_j@ifs.org.uk for more 
details.  
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1975–79 cohorts. Among those born between 1965 and 1969 (who turned 
18 before 1988), 16% of men held degrees in their late 20s. For the birth 
cohort born just one decade later (who turned 18 after 1993), this 
proportion had nearly doubled to 30%. The increase was even greater for 
women. In fact, 1975–79 was the first birth cohort where women had a 
higher graduate proportion than men. Some of the dramatic change 
between the 1965–69 and 1975–79 cohorts was related to the 1992 
reform that gave polytechnics university status in 1992, but polytechnics 
awarded degrees before 1992 and there was also a rapid increase in 
student numbers throughout the period from 1988 to 1994. The expansion 
slowed down in 1994, when the maximum student number control (which 
limited the number of full-time undergraduates each university could 
admit) was introduced.  
 Fact 2: Despite the recent fall in the average graduate real wage, their 
wage relative to school-leavers’ has remained relatively unchanged. 
Indeed, at any given age, the wage differential between graduates and 
school-leavers has stayed essentially unchanged across birth cohorts. 
One way to see how the army of graduates have fared in recent years is to 
look at their average wage relative to the Consumer Price Index. Figure 2 
reveals that between 2008 and 2013, the real median hourly wage of 25- 
to 29-year-old graduates fell by nearly 20%. The level in 2015 is about 
15% below the 2008 peak and roughly the same as the level in the mid 
1990s. However gloomy this picture may be, it cannot be taken as direct 
evidence of a substantial negative impact from the increasing supply of 
graduates lowering their wages. The real median wage among school-
leavers also fell by 15% between 2008 and 2015. In fact, the median wage 
differential between graduates and school-leavers has essentially stayed 
flat at around 35% over the past two decades for 25- to 29-year-olds. 
Meanwhile, the median wage differential between those with GCSEs and 
those without (the ratio between the second and third series in figure 2) 
has fallen from a bit over 1.3 in the early 90s to 1.2 in 2015.3 
                                                     
3 This trend is interesting and it partly explains the difference between our findings and 
the conclusion in the Bank of England 2016Q1 report about the fall in graduate wage 
premium. Note too that the proportion with post-graduate education, although small, 
has increased in recent years together with an increase in the return to post-graduate 
degrees.   
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Figure 2. Median real hourly wage of 25- to 29-year-olds, by education 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Labour Force Survey 1992–2015. The deflator is the 
Consumer Price Index, ONS series D7BT.  
The wage data are more striking when arranged by birth cohorts. In Figure 
3, each curve plots, for a particular birth cohort, the ratio of the median 
wage of graduates to the median wage of school-leavers against age. It is a 
picture of curves literally on top of each other. At any given age, there is no 
obvious shift across cohorts in the wage differential. For illustration, let us 
zoom in on the 1965–69 and 1975–79 birth cohorts, which differed in the 
graduate proportion by more than 10 percentage points. At age 25, the 
wage differential between graduates and school-leavers is 25% for the 
1965–69 cohort and 28% for the 1975–79 cohort. These rise to 45% and 
48% for the two cohorts respectively at age 30, and to 58% for both at age 
35. Thus, the 1975–79 cohort, which had double the proportion of 
graduates that the 1965–69 cohort had, had the same or a slightly higher 
relative graduate wage.  
At first sight, there is something surprising about Figures 1 and 3. The 
supply of graduates has increased enormously. One would normally expect 
that to result in a reduction in their relative wage. This has not happened. 
This puzzle is the subject of an IFS working paper published last month.4  
                                                     
R. Blundell, D. Green and W. Jin, ‘The UK wage premium puzzle: how did a large 
increase in university graduates leave the education premium unchanged?’, IFS 
Working Paper W16/01, http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8322. 
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Figure 3. Ratio of graduate median hourly wage to that of school-leavers, by birth 
cohort 
 
Note: The sample contains 23- to 59-year-olds. Each data point is based on two education 
groups, both of which have at least 50 wage observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Labour Force Survey 1992–2015. 
Understanding this historical puzzle is important if one is interested in 
extrapolating into the future. Given that the major expansion of graduates 
happened without a fall in their relative wages, should we expect this to 
occur again with a new expansion? Our answer would be no. 
3. The explanations  
The working paper mentioned above examines differences in graduate 
proportions and wage ratios by subgroups. For example, the proportion of 
graduates among immigrants is higher than that among natives and the 
share of immigrants in the UK workforce has increased considerably over 
time, but whether or not we include immigrants in the data does not 
change the story qualitatively. Among the natives, the graduate proportion 
increased significantly across cohorts while the wage ratio was constant. 
The same basic patterns are observed if we exclude postgraduates or the 
public sector or look at each gender separately. In other words, none of 
those observed characteristics of individuals can explain the puzzle. 
It is possible that some unobserved characteristics of graduates (such as 
innate ability) are also changing. The large and rapid expansion of higher 
education may draw students from lower down the ability distribution. 
The quality of education provided may also deteriorate given the fall in 
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funding per student. To the extent that graduates of more recent cohorts 
have lower productivity than those from previous cohorts, we should 
expect a negative impact on the observed wages of graduates. And this 
would be in addition to the standard negative effect of a supply increase on 
prices. Thus, the idea that the quality of graduates has declined does not, 
by itself, help to explain the lack of reduction in their relative wages. But it 
may have contributed to a fall in their absolute wage level. 
Meanwhile, the quality composition of school-leavers might have 
deteriorated as well. The ‘best’ of them in the past would now become 
graduates. To explain the puzzle, we would need the quality of the average 
school-leaver to decline more than that of the average graduate. The IFS 
working paper estimates the size of quality changes that would be needed 
to rationalise the data patterns. It finds not only that the magnitude seems 
implausibly large, but also that the ‘quality’ of the new graduates would 
have to vary substantially by year and age group, and in just such a way 
that it perfectly balanced out other forces, to leave the wage differential 
unchanged at each point in time. While we cannot rule out this possibility, 
we find it highly implausible. Instead, we emphasise an explanation in 
which the flat wage differential arises from the functioning of the 
economy. 
As explained in the working paper, firms can respond to changes in the 
supply of skills by changing how they organise and manage the workforce. 
Specifically, UK firms have become less hierarchical over time: instead of 
having a few skilled managers to dictate how a larger number of unskilled 
workers should work, now more managerial decisions are decentralised 
and made by skilled workers. In a series of influential papers,5 Professor 
John Van Reenen and co-authors have shown that British and French firms 
have been transitioning towards more decentralised decision-making in 
recent decades and that there is synergy between having a high proportion 
of educated workers and having a decentralised management structure. 
                                                     
5 E. Caroli and J. Van Reenen, ‘Skill-biased organizational change? Evidence from a 
panel of British and French establishments’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 
116(4), 1449–92.  
N. Bloom, R. Sadun and J. Van Reenen, ‘Americans do IT better: US multinationals and 
the productivity miracle’, American Economic Review, 2012, 102(1), 167–201. 
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The IFS working paper proposes an economic model in which firms choose 
between two organisational forms: the old, centralised form and the 
newer, decentralised one. Here, we think of the choice of organisational 
form as a choice of ‘technology’, just like IT is a kind of technology. The 
decentralised organisational form is more profitable if and only if the 
supply of graduates is sufficiently high. When the economy starts with a 
very low proportion of graduates, the traditional organisational form will 
dominate. As the relative supply of graduates increases, the relative wage 
will fall and, once it reaches a critical threshold, firms will begin to adopt 
the newer decentralised form of organisation. The relative wage will stay 
at that critical level until all the firms have switched to the new form. After 
that, the relative wage should fall if the supply of graduates continues to 
rise. Thus, there exists a transitional period when the relative wage of 
graduates is invariant to supply changes. 
We argue that this is how the UK avoided any obvious decline in the wage 
differential between graduates and school-leavers during the 1990s and 
the 2000s, when the proportion of graduates increased substantially. That 
was the transitional period when more and more firms switched to the 
decentralised organisational form. This theory is supported by some 
evidence from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey. The 
proportion of employees who report having a lot of influence about ‘the 
range of tasks you do in your job’ or ‘how you work’ has increased 
substantially between the 1998 survey and the 2011 one. Moreover, 
employees in areas with a higher graduate proportion are significantly 
more likely to report that than those in areas with a lower graduate 
proportion.  
4. The future 
So, what does this theory imply for the future? It suggests that, after all 
firms have adopted the new organisational form – that is, after the 
transitional phase – any further increase in the graduate proportion 
should have a negative impact on graduates’ relative wage. The IFS 
working paper suggests that the UK economy has probably moved out of 
the transitional phase recently and there is already some sign of a relative 
wage decline in the private sector in the last couple of years. For example, 
the median graduate-to-school-leaver wage ratio among 30- to 34-year-
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olds in the private sector has fallen from an average of 1.63 in the 2000s to 
1.55 in the 2010s. 
Hence, we believe future increases in the proportion of graduates in the 
UK will tend to reduce graduates’ relative wages, unless some other skill-
biased technology becomes available. And that technology has to be 
sufficiently general to be applicable in all sectors (like how the IT 
revolution and decentralised organisational form spread across the 
economy). But we do not expect a future UK higher education expansion to 
automatically generate such a new general technology. The decentralised 
organisational form was first implemented by US firms and US 
multinationals before it was adopted by UK firms. Now that the UK is 
surpassing the US in terms of the proportion of graduates, there is not 
another readily-available general technology that the UK can adopt from 
the US. 
To summarise, we have investigated how the historical rise of graduate 
proportion occurred without a substantial decline in graduates’ relative 
wages. To be clear, what we have done is to explain historical wage trends 
for different education groups, rather than estimating the true causal 
impact of degrees on individuals’ wages. Thus, neither the flat relative 
wage movements in the past nor our conclusion about future wage trends 
implies that getting a degree will not be worth it any more. In addition to 
higher wages, a degree may bring the individual other benefits such as a 
lower risk of unemployment or access to some interesting careers. 
Similarly, the findings do not allow us to say whether the UK is producing 
too many or too few graduates. The social returns to higher education 
could be very different from the private returns, as one person getting a 
degree could affect other graduates and non-graduates in many positive 
and negative ways.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics in 2015 
 Aged 25–29 Aged 30–59 
% graduates 41% 32% 
% school-leavers 49% 54% 
 Among 
graduates 
Among 
school-
leavers 
Among 
graduates 
Among 
school-
leavers 
Employment rate 88.3% 78.7% 89.4% 83.2% 
Hourly wages     
10th percentile  £7.05 £6.25 £8.45 £6.53 
Median  £12.36 £9.21 £17.31 £11.33 
90th percentile  £23.08 £15.93 £34.63 £22.13 
Note: “graduates” are those with first degrees or higher qualifications. “School-leavers” refers 
to those with at least GCSE grade C or equivalent qualifications and without first degrees. 
“School-leavers” include those with just A-levels or below-degree-level higher education 
qualifications.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from quarterly Labour Force Survey 2015Q1–Q4. 
